

Message Text

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R 051703Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8057

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 1463

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR NO UR SV

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BRATTELI DISCUSSES HIS USSR TRIP

REF: OSLO 1369

BEGIN SUMMARY. PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR PARIS TODAY,
PRIME MINISTER BRATTELI BRIEFED ME FOR OVER ONE HOUR
ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE EMPHASIZED THAT
THE VISIT PRODUCED NOTHING SENSATIONAL AND THAT THE
OBVIOUS SOVIET AIM WAS TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD
WILL. HE HAD NO INTENTION, BRATTELI STRESSED, OF
LETTING NORWAY GET INTO THE POSITION OF FINLAND WHICH
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MUST CONSULT THE USSR BEFORE DOING ANYTHING. ASKED

ABOUT A POSSIBLE U.S. ROLE IN THE ARCTIC, BRATTELI SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO NORWAY IF THE U.S. AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE 1920 SVALBARD TREAT WERE TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE AREA. END SUMMARY.

1. BRATTELI WAS IN A VERY RELAXED MOOD AS HE BRIEFED ME FOR OVER ONE HOUR REGARDING HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW, AS HE HAD PROMISED. HE SAID NOTHING SENSATIONAL HAD DEVELOPED IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT; THE SOVIET AIM WAS CLEARLY TO MINIMIZE ANY FORM OF CONTROVERSY AND CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD WILL. THERE WERE DISCUSSIONS BUT NO NEGOTIATIONS, WITH BOTH SIDES INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS. BRATTELI SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND BREZHNEV VERY GRACIOUS AND WAS SURPRISED THAT HE DID NOT REACT STRONGLY TO DISCUSSION OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES LIKE HUMAN RIGHTS. BRATTELI NOTED THAT SOVIET AND NORWEGIAN PRACTICES DIFFERED REGARDING THE SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENTS: NORWAY WAS NOT MUCH FOR SIGNING AGREEMENTS WHILE THE RUSSIANS ALWAYS APPEAR TO WANT TO SIGN SOMETHING. HE CITED THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TELEVISION AND RADIO ORGANIZATIONS AS ONE OF THOSE RATHER MEANINGLESS AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT WORTH ARGUING ABOUT.

2. FINLANDIZATION. BRATTELI SPOKE WITH MOST FEELING WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE AGREEMENT TO PROMOTE EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE REPLIED THAT NORWAY WILL PROMOTE ONLY THOSE EXCHANGES THAT SERVE SOME PRACTICAL PURPOSE. AFTER TELLING HIS NOTE TAKER NOT TO WRITE THIS DOWN, HE WENT ON WITH SOME HEAT TO SAY THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT TO CONSULT REGULARLY WITH THE USSR. HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE WOULD NOT PLACE NORWAY IN SITUATION LIKE FINLAND IN WHICH SOVIETS WOULD EXPECT NORWAY TO CONSULT EVERY TIME IT WANTED TO DO ANYTHING.

3. SVALBARD AND THE U.S. BRATTELI EXPLAINED THAT NORWAY HAS ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SVALBARD AND PROBLEMS ARE BETWEEN NORWAY AND ALL SIGNATORY
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POWERS AND NOT JUST BETWEEN NORWAY AND RUSSIA. I ASKED PM FRANKLY WHAT HIS REACTIONS WOULD BE IF U.S. WERE TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE INTEREST IN SVALBARD. HE REPLIED CAUTIOUSLY THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SOME OF THE SIGNATORY POWERS, INCLUDING THE U.S. WERE MORE ACTIVE, IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE USSR THAT IT WAS NOT THE ONLY COUNTRY WITH AN INTEREST IN THE AREA. SO FAR AS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

FOR JOINT RESEARCH ON SVALBARD ARE CONCERNED, BRATTELI SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO BECOME TOO INVOLVED WITH THE RUSSIANS.

4. OIL AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. BRATTELI SAID THAT THE NORWEGIANS HAD HOPED TO HAVE NEGOTIATIONS ON DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN THE BARENTS SEA OPEN SOMEWHAT EARLIER BUT RUSSIANS POSTPONED OPENING ON THE GROUNDS THEY WOULD NEED MORE TIME SINCE SOVIET OFFICIALS TAKE THEIR HOLIDAYS LATER. BRATTELI INSISTED THAT DELIMITATION IS A QUESTION FOR THE EXPERTS TO DECIDE. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN NORWEGIAN OIL TECHNOLOGY BUT HAD ALSO HINTED THEY MIGHT FAVOR JOINT PARTICIPATION IN OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE BARENTS SEA. I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN FIRMS PARTICIPATING IN OIL DEVELOPMENT OFF NORTH NORWAY. HE REPLIED THAT NORWAY HAD NOT YET FIRMED UP ITS POLICY ON THIS QUESTION, BUT THAT HE HAD ANTICIPATED IT WOULD REMAIN ONE OF "NORWAY FOR THE NORWEGIANS." HE ADDED THAT, WHILE SOVIETS DID NOT SAY SO DIRECTLY, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE FOREIGN COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE AREA.

5. CSCE. BREZHNEV MADE CLEAR HIS INTEREST IN HAVING THE THIRD PHASE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. HE ALSO INDICATED HE DID NOT WISH THE CONFERENCE TO TAKE ANY DECISIONS INVOLVING A POSSIBLE CHANGING OF BORDERS OR INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS; IN THIS CONNECTION, HE DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS EMIGRATION RIGHTS. HOWEVER, TO CREATE A GOOD ATMOSPHERE, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO PERMIT A SOVIET WIFE TO JOIN HER NORWEGIAN HUSBAND--A LONG STANDING CASE IN WHICH MRS. BRATTELI HAD A PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL

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INTEREST. BRATTELI SAID THAT, WHILE HE KNEW IT WOULD DO NO GOOD, HE EXPLAINED TO BREZHNEV WHY NORWAY IS CONCERNED ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. MISCELLANEOUS. BRATTELI COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON VARIOUS OTHER ISSUES WHICH CAME UP DURING HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW:

--SOVIET CONSULATE. BRATTELI SAID HE IS NOT INCLINED TO CHANGE HIS MIND AND APPROVE THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR A CONSULATE IN TROMSO.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 OSLO 1463

EXDIS

--SAS. WHEN THE DANISH PRIME MINISTER RAISED THE QUESTION OF OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS TO CHINA DURING HIS 1973 VISIT TO MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS CUT OFF DISCUSSION. BRATTELI WAS THEREFORE PLEASED THAT, THIS TIME, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS, BUT HE SHOWED LITTLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT.

--CHINA. THERE WAS ONLY ONE PASSING REFERENCE TO CHINA, MADE IN BREZHNEV'S OPENING 45-MINUTE SPEECH. BREZHNEV SAID HE COULD NOT FIND THE WORD "SUPER POWERS" IN THE DICTIONARY; IT MUST BE A CHINESE CONCEPT.

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--NATO MEMBERSHIP. THIS QUESTION ALSO CAME UP ONLY IN PASSING. BRATTELI WAS PLEASED THAT IT GAVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE NORWAY'S POLICY OPPOSING FOREIGN BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ITS SOIL.

--MIDDLE EAST. WHEN I POINTED TO THE LANGUAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE CALLING ON THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA TO HANDLE "ALL" ASPECTS OF MIDDLE EAST ARRANGEMENTS, BRATTELI TOLD ME NOT TO READ ANYTHING INTO WHAT IS SIMPLY COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE. SO FAR AS HE IS CONCERNED, WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS TO GET A M.E. SETTLEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IT DOES NOT MATTER HOW, FOR EXAMPLE, SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT IS ARRANGED.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS. I ASKED HIM WHAT HIS GENERAL IMPRESSIONS WERE, COMPARING THIS VISIT WITH HIS PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GET A REAL FEEL AS TO WHAT PREOCCUPIES THE USSR DURING SUCH A FORMAL VISIT. HE WAS STRUCK FORCEFULLY, HOWEVER, BY THE CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD WEST GERMANY. DURING HIS PREVIOUS TRIP IN 1968 THE SOVIETS HAD KEPT PLAYING UP THE WEST GERMAN THREAT. NOW SOVIET OFFICIALS REFERRED TO GERMANY AS A GOOD AND "RELIABLE FRIEND." SOVIET STATEMENTS WERE ALSO SPRINKLED WITH REFERENCES TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.; MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF SUCH RELATIONS WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT TO MOSCOW. WHILE BRATTELI APPEARED SOMEWHAT AWED, HE WAS ALSO CLEARLY AMUSED BY THE POMP AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE USSR, WHICH WERE NOT AT ALL HIS STYLE. BYRNE

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